The first round of Indonesia’s first direct popular election for the presidency unfolded relatively calmly on July 5. The vote throughout this sprawling archipelago of more than 220 million persons in Southeast Asia was hailed as a major and successful expression of democracy in many Asian and Western circles, but as Dr Klaus H. Schreiner, a veteran observer and participant in Indonesian affairs, relates, the eventual outcome is still highly uncertain and whoever claims the presidency may face a continuing contentious political environment. And both the recent April parliamentary election and the presidential campaign were largely devoid of specifics and policy positions.

By the afternoon of July 15, 2004 some 105.230.965 ballot sheets had been counted. The preliminary result still shows the same stable trend that was obvious from the beginning of the counting. It presented the ticket of the former Co-ordinating Minister for Politics and Security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, together with his former colleague from the cabinet, former Co-ordinating Minister of People's Welfare party Jusuf Kalla taking the lead with approximately one-third of the popular vote.

This is still a remarkable result, even though it is far from achieving the 45% or even the absolute majority that some polling results had predicted prior to the vote casting.

Trailing behind is incumbent Megawati Sukarnoputri and her new companion, former chair of the largest Muslim organisation Nahdlatul Ulama, Hasyim Muzadi. This result is also remarkable because it is much better then predicted. The incumbent was expected to come in only on the third position receiving not more then 10 to 12 % of the votes. In fact, Mega and Hasyim collected more then a quarter of the votes (26,29 %). Thus taking Hasyim on the ticket proved to be a successful tactical move for Megawati, since she probably could garner votes from the NU constituency.

Even though trailing closely behind Megawati with 22, 19%, the present result for former General Wiranto and his running mate Solahuddin Wahid seems to be disappointing. Nominally speaking; Wiranto's present percentage hardly exceeds the percentage his party GOLKAR could win during the election for the parliament in April. However, since some of the votes of GOLKAR probably went to Jusuf Kalla, Wiranto and Solahuddin must have received additional support from other quarters then their own party, possibly from NU and PKB factions.

Amien Rais and Siswono Yudhohusodo did quite well, presently ending up with 14,87%. It seems very likely that next to Amien's own party PAN also a significant share of the PKS votes supported this pairing, despite the fact that there was a fierce discussion between the "idealists" within the PKS who supported Amien and the "real politik" wing supporting Wiranto.

Receiving a share of 3,06 % Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar remained below the margin Hamzah Haz's party PPP had reached in the general election in April. His political career may thus come to an end, especially so since his running mate Agum has already been mentioned as a possible successor to Hamzah as the PPP party chair.

Even though counting is still going on and the final results are not to expected before July 26, the stability of the trend allows for some certainty about the necessary runoff, which is to take place on September 20. However, It appears probable that the Wiranto team might challenge the results, if the margin narrows down. In that case the various irregularities, double punching of ballot sheet, the vote rigging in the pesantren al-Zaytun (which on July 16 has been annulled and will be repeated), as well as the high number or invalid votes and the relatively low turnout (no exact figure is yet available) will deliver a welcome pretext to bring them to court.

Nevertheless, the teams of both SBY and Mega are already preparing for the second round by holding open and behind the scene meetings both with the (probably) defeated GOLKAR and thoseparties supporting the unsuccessful candidates. While it appears possible or even likely that PDI-P and GOLKAR join forces to prevent SBY from becoming President, some smaller parties like the PPP are still reluctant to joint the big coalition of the old forces. An important factor will be the unity of the GOLKAR constituency. It remains open whether the rift between the supporters of Akbar Tandjung on the one hand, who was defeated as the candidate by Wiranto on the other hand, can be overcome. Since Akbar is in favour of supporting Megawati and entertains good relations to her her husband Taufiq Kiemas, the question whether Akbar can regain control of those factions of GOLKAR supporting Wiranto or not, will be a very crucial one

Another influential constituency is the quarter of the military at large that is only partly overlapping with the GOLKAR. Will they support a civilian president and her cabinet where the military has not a visibly significant share, or will they vote for a president with military background who nevertheless wants to reduce the role of the military.

The Muslim portions of the electorate and their respective decisions of whom to support in the second round of voting are still difficult to read. The NU and the informal kingmaker, former President Abdurrahman Wahid, will play a crucial role in this respect. Much of the voting behaviour of the traditionalist NU constituency will depend on his signals, since both candidates for the vice-presidency are affiliated to the NU, even though to a different degree. The modernist section of Islam represented by PAN and PKS and holding a combined share of 15% have not yet decided where to throw their weight. Some smaller parties like the PBB of former Minister of Justice Yusril Mahendra, however, have already joined with SBY's Democratic Party.

Should Megawati win, her cabinet would be based on a broad coalition of the old persisting forces in the parliament and therefore enjoy the support of the assembly. A successful Susilo would be confronted by this very coalition and would have difficulties in finding parliamentary support for his political agenda. Neither of both options offers a very hopeful prospect for democratisation and economic stabilisation in the country.