Following last July’s impressive protest, when 500,000 people gathered in the Hong Kong Streets to demand their political and civil rights, the Democrat Party and others had expected to gain more support from the public. The result of the Legislative Council (Legco) election in September revealed itself as a major disappointment for the members of the pro-democracy parties.

“Don’t even call it a victory, we are losing our cards,” a re-elected pro-democrat candidate groaned with tears in his eyes. Besides the incidence of the proportional system, the relative failure of the Democrats shows evidence of the complex dilemma Hong Kong people have been faced with. Since South East Asia’s economy started running sluggish, the Hong Kong population has been placed before a difficult dilemma with regard to their political and civil rights. How much are the latter worth at time of economic and social crisis?

Since Hong Kong reintegrated Mainland China, the dropping employment rate and discouraging economic outlook have paved the way for Beijing to exert a growing political influence over Hong Kong, using the SAR economic needs as a an efficient tool.

The local election had been widely regarded as a historic test for both public sentiment on behalf of basic rights and also as a possible showcase for such popular expression for such Special Authority Regions and the entire Mainland. Instead, the results seemed inconclusive at best or even as a loss of support for pro-democracy forces. The Democratic Party, especially was shocked by its failure to win additional seats at the expense of other younger pro-democracy independent candidates.

The party, which commanded 11 of the 22 pro- democracy seats in the previous legislature, now counts nine lawmakers among 25 liberal legislators in the new lawmaking body. On the other hand, the number of non-affiliated pro-democracy candidates increased to 13 from seven.

Pro-democracy forces received another later in November when Hong Kong's chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa, ruled out a referendum on whether to hold full direct elections in the territory from 2007.

A Chinese idea of real politics

The current strategy of the Chinese government towards SARs, recently put forward by Premier Wen during his recent visit in Hong Kong, shows evidence of a willingness to focus on economics as a modest veil on ideological issues. In this perspective, Beijing is determined to draw the Hong Kong public’s attention on benefits that the Mainland may bring to Hong Kong, putting aside unsolved ideological issues. Indeed, the recent outcome of the Legco election seems to prove the effectiveness of such a policy. Beijing considered that a large percentage of the 500,000 demonstrators against China’s Chief Executive in Hong Kong Tung Chee-hwa were mainly motivated by their dissatisfactions and frustrations towards the current economic situation in Hong Kong. The situation is not that simple. As a manager of a textile SME admitted, the reason why he did not vote for the Democrats was that 20% of his clients are from the Mainland. One could hardly consider such attitude as evidence that people are ready to settle for their fundamental rights.

Several projects for a closer economic partnership have been reached between Beijing and Hong Kong on the initiative of Mainland China. This policy recently led to the Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) which was signed in June 2004 that ensures freedom of movement for Hong Kong workers willing to seek employment on the Mainland.

Some SAR residents have already sensed the change of wind and tried and found a balance between foreseeable economic benefits and un-negotiable political issues with Beijing. ‘China is a big country and Hong Kong is small. Striking a balance is good for Hong Kong’ a pro-Beijing teacher declared following the Legco election, undoubtedly summing up a widespread concern among Hong Kong habitants.

Political reconciliation

The Chinese government has recently drafted new strategies regarding SAR related issues.

Beijing first gave up on insisting on the setting up a tight schedule for the enactment of the much-feared law against subversion, sedition, and leakage of state secrets. The CCP leadership had pressed the Hong Kong administration to pass a draconian bill aiming to prevent any actions which may ‘have bad impacts or damage the state integrity’. Secondly, when facing the press, the Chinese leadership has tended to avoid political comments on the so called ‘Hong Kong Rebellion’ but focus on issues directly raised by the economic partnership between Mainland and Hong Kong, keeping silent on the unstable political situation. Lastly, in order to improve its image in the international community, Beijing decided to invite ten newly elected pro-democracy members of the Legco for the celebration on its national day at the beginning of October. Since many pro-democrats have been considered as troublemakers or traitors and have been banned from entering into Mainland for years, this decision has been perceived as an ice-breaking step towards better bilateral communication and understanding.

Rather than a fundamental debate, the Hong Kong dilemma should rather be seen in terms of priorities. The Hong Kong democrats' struggle for political and civil rights will have more chance to be at the forefront of public demands when their economic welfare is assured. However, since the economic situation of Hong Kong will increasingly depend on Mainland China, the question must be raised as to whether the latter will be willing to grant more fundamental rights. Similarly, when economic growth and employment is assured, will the Hong Kong people be ready to press for them?

On the other side of the Hong Kong dilemma, there are unconfirmed reports from knowledgeable sources in Hong Kong, that the leadership in Beijing is dissatisfied and furious at the counter-productive performance of their hand-picked leader, Tung-Chee Hwa, in the city state. Many are said to feel that he has mismanaged virtually every major issue and turned a possibly favourable or optimistic advantage into a negative or confrontational one. Some are also believed to want to oust him but are afraid that could also backfire as a sign of error and weakness.

By Wan-jing Wang