A page may have been turned which could have profound ramifications internally in South Korea and internationally as well in the aftermath of Parliamentary elections which resulted in an expected shift in the political centre of gravity.

The upstart Uri Party, led by defectors from the ruling New Millennium Party (NMP) and a host of veteran pro-democracy political activists and dissidents in their forties, overwhelmed the conservative Grand National Party and others traditional bastions of power to obtain 152 seats in the 299 to the Parliament in scheduled national elections April 5.

The shift which had been already apparent in the Presidential elections of 2002 which had lifted civil rights advocate Rho Moo-hyun to the office, despite the continuing dominance of the GNP in the Parliament, accentuated in the 2004 Parliament elections just weeks after conservatives staged a last-ditch attempt to reverse the Presidential decision by impeaching the officeholder.

The Uri groundswell was based on a campaign against the impeachment, corruption, powerful industrial and regional interests and in favour of reforms, greater democracy and a more independent foreign policy.

While President Roh was not a member of the party created only seven months earlier and had not party affiliation, he was expected to join after the Supreme Court decided on the validity of the impeachment vote against him. It was expected that the Court would overturn the March 12 impeachment as frivolous and unjustified and restore him to office.

He was widely expected to be strengthened from the election and to quickly reshuffle his Cabinet. He has said that Korean politics might become less confrontational than in the past year that led to the impeachment action, but move toward more dialogue and consensus.

While the impeachment decision was still subject to a Supreme Court review after the elections and some analysts foresaw difficulties in the new Uri majority to impose its will, the developments were also regarded as having led to a realignment of the electorate and other established party leaderships. Many of the older leaders of the traditional parties involved in the impeachment drive retired and tended to be replaced by younger men and women, believed to symbolise fresher views. In the eyes of many, it could mark the assumption of the reins of power from the traditional industrial, political and military elites which had led the country with pro-business policies since the 1950s.

Many of the Uri leaders and supporters, such as its floor leader in the previous National Assembly Kim Geun-tae, were dissidents during the previous military dictatorships and he spent three years in prison beginning in 1985 for such activities. While Uri Party leader Chung Dong-young's tried to focus on addressing people's concerns during the election campaign, Kim stressed the theme of "democracy versus anti-democracy" and urged the electorate to judge those who forced through the presidential impeachment as what he described as "anti democracy forces." These former student dissidents are said to number about 50 of the party’s 152 parliamentarians. But there is also a group of some 80 more centrist pro-business members composed of defectors from the New Millennium Party who favour stability rather than reform. Another from the small Democratic Reform Party backers of President Roh are advocates of fundamental and far-reaching social and economic reforms. Some analysts have called the group “a jumbled, odd collection,” of at least three different wings that could dilute its apparent strength a force an internal power struggle.

Many analysts foresee that the advent of the Uri Party in a majority could increase pressure for some shifts in ROK foreign policy, especially regarding relations with the US, the dispatch of Korean troops to Iraq and relations with neighbouring North Korea. While the party supported the decision to send 3600 troops to Iraq, many of its younger members opposed this policy and called for a reversal, a move that also has considerable backing in the public. The analysts indicate that while debate and pressure on this issue might be expected to increase, it would be unlikely to radically change policy since it would be considered a major loss of face for the country. But the force when fully deployed in June, after the handover of power to Iraqis, would make the contingent the third largest in the coalition behind the US and UK, although they would be non-combatants. And with the security situation deteriorating and other countries pulling their forces out, the temptation for a reversal in Korea could also become stronger. Some members have also called for a more independent policy regarding the traditional ties with the US, but others seen little alternative but to continue to depend on US protection against North Korea. But most of the party is cool to the type of coercive diplomacy advocated by the US, favouring closer relations with the North to seek conciliation. It has also been said within the country that since the presidential election in December 2002 and the turnover of the office in 2003, President Roh had not fashioned a true policy of his own toward North Korea, except to essentially follow his predecessor’s Sunshine Policy. This had meant with some criticism from some of his more liberal backers and could prompt a true review of policy options.

While these could lead to some increased tension with the US, the party and the President have backed the US position in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea in Beijing that the North should halt completely its nuclear programmes