The recent elections in Japan may have marked a historic turning point not only for that important country, but for Asia and the International Community.

Not only did the Japanese electorate decide to attempt to close the era of what had essentially become a one-party state, it seemed also to have elected a potential new force not only in domestic politics, but in international affairs as well. In the uncertain real world of Japanese and global politics, only time will tell whether this amounts to real, virtual, or only momentary change.

The desire for a change was overwhelming. But was it more a protest vote against decades of complacency, stagnation or even decline by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party? Could it have been only an understandable reaction against the global economic and social crisis, which in Japan has only prolonged what had been termed "the lost decade?"

Numerous analysts, political figures and other commentators have either cautiously withheld judment, or suggested that there may be not significant change in either internal or foreign policies under the new Democratic Party of Japan Premier. .Some did focus on his apparent criticism of past American orientations and his country's strong identification with its trans-Pacific ally and assumed the new Japanese Administation would not go so far as to undermine that relationship.

To be sure, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama, who himself is a former LDP member, may not have a broad margin of maneuver with a broad coalition of small parties that spans a broad political spectrum. It includes Socialists and former ruling LDP members who are said to be more to the right than the recent Prime Ministers Aso and Abe. But perhaps he should draw inspiration from the successes of other Asian colleagues in India and Indonesia, who saw their own leadership of disparate coalitions rewarded in elections this year by electorate support for more power. And he could count on broader international support for Japan to take a new approach after decades of dependency in domestic and international affairs. What is more important, according to a seasoned Japanese analyst in Europe, could be his support among a whole new generation of Japanese who regard the old-style national political system as in need of more contact with reality.

The next few weeks should bring additional insight as the new leadership meets with the G-20 conclave, East Asian partners and others. And a prime Japanese sources also points to elections next year to the Upper House that should focus the mind and also bring fresh reactions from the public.As the Financial Times of London remarked in an editorial September 1, "It must show it can govern...must move quickly to establish its credentials" at the same time it must persuade markets that its social and fiscal promises "will not break the bank."

Parisian daily Le Monde September 1 cited Pierre-François Souyri, professor of Japanese studies at the University of Geneva, as noting that the election marked "the end of the postwar period in Japan," and recommending that the DPJ make itself the guarantor of the country's pacifist constitution, which the LDP had begun to challenge, and improve relations with China. Editorial opinion in Germany tended to emphasise the "revolutionary" nature of the vote that also closed the postwar period, its desire to "send the LDP packing" and of the "mandate for change." The Berlin Tagespiegel remarked that "things can only get better, " while the more conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung commented "The word 'revolution' doesn't exactly fit with what has happened in Japan. At first glance it's pretty easy to assume Sunday's results are revolutionary. However, in the first moments of his triumph, Hatoyama had already announced that a DPJ-led government would not change everything in Japan. And perhaps that's even the key to why a former opposition party won in such an overwhelming way. The Japanese simply hope things will get better (again). They will probably have to face disappointments, but it's doubtful they will be yearning for the LDP's return anytime soon."

After years of political agitation and radicalism in Japan in the 1960s and 1970s, dissent had been gradually marginalised in recent decades and condemed as ambarrasing or shameful. But the vote suggested it had not completely disappeared but was mounting to a tipping point in the wake of evident lack of leadership or solution to pressing public concerns.

What have probably alarmed more conservative observers around the world seemed to revolve around his spoken and implied criticism of American "unilateralism" and "market fundamentalism" and his vision of a united Asia that draws inspiration from the European experience, even going so far as advocating eventually a common Asian currency.

Possibly most disturbing for American partners was his persistent harsh tone of criticism for what American leadership in economic and political issues has stood for for the past decade or more, culminating in his support for a redefenition of the US military presence in Japan and a more "equal" relationship.

But his chosen Foreign Minister, Katsuya Okada, spent a year at Harvard, maintains close ties to American policymakers and is considered more pro-American than others in the DPJ, although he severely criticised previous Japanese governments for spoiling relations with Asian neighbours, indicating some balance in priorities.

Hatoyama's insistence on Japan's key role in the global dialogue on climate change seemed to some in Europe as a welcome change, that could combine with the comparable American change of heart to embolden Europeans who seem increasingly weary of bearing the brunt of advocacy for meaningful efforts to address climate change during what also seemed like a "wasted decade" since adoption of the Tokyo Protocol. The first Japanese measure recently, according to first reactions, seem to have drawn the predictable reservation from Japan's powerful business and industrial lobbies, who should instead be in the vanguard of those who know from experience how to be more competitive by being more efficient.

Also indicative, disturbing to some of course, have been Hotoyama's suggestions he could terminate his country's participation in military support missions in the Indian Ocean in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.Japan may be of more help, like the EU, as a civilian alternative to global challenges than as a largely meaningless symbolic supporter of the military option.

In addition, coming after years of hesitation, confusion, but some nevertheless well-intentioned initiatives to create an East Asia Community or proposals for a regional security system, the arrival of such leadership or support from Tokyo should be welcomed and taken up. In his widely-noted August article, Hatoyama observed: "Another national goal that emerges from the concept of fraternity is the creation of an East Asian community. Of course, the Japan-U.S. security pact will continue to be the cornerstone of Japanese diplomatic policy. But at the same time, we must not forget our identity as a nation located in Asia. I believe that the East Asian region, which is showing increasing vitality, must be recognized as Japan's basic sphere of being. So we must continue to build frameworks for stable economic cooperation and security across the region."

Citing the European example, Hatoyama stressed the objectives or currency integration and resolving difficult political, historical, security dispute

But what may have been a most remarkable element of his pronouncement in the international press, was his repeated references to either a desire for a new form of what he termed "fraternity" in East Asia, and his equally frequent references to the European experiences.

Either he or his ghost writer displayed a knowledge of the historical underpinning of European integration that goes beyond those of most Europeans for that matter. He cited Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, the Austro-Hungarian leader of the early pan-European movement in the early 20th century, whose mother was Japanese. In a book translated by Hatoyama's grandfather, the European prophet remarked: "All great historical ideas started as a utopian dream and ended with reality. Whether a particular idea remains as a utopian dream or becomes a reality depends on the number of people who believe in the ideal and their ability to act upon it."

One Internet blogger also underlined that former Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda had also cited European socio-historian Fernand Braudel in one of his major presentations during his brief tenure.

It would be a wasted opportunity for Japan, Asia, or the country's Western partners not to take up the challenge.

While the atmosphere at the EU-China Summit meeting in Prague May 20 seemed to be correct and cordial, it also seemed evident that the the six months' interval between the cancelled summit planned for Lyon in late 2008 and the one in Prague had not served to prepare any major breakthroughs.

Before the aborted meeting in Lyon, European diplomats had warned that little substantive headway should be expected on major problem areas, and Prague revealed that not much had changed, even if relations appeared by have been normalised after the turmoil raised by French President Sarkozy's meeting with the Dalai Lama that led to the cancellation.

Declarations emerged from Prague on such issues as trade negotiations, protectionism, climate change and other global issues, but problem areas related to the ongoing bilateral negotiations on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), or market economy status, the arms embargo, or other traditional irritants seemed to remain.

Even if it achievements were less than resounding, the EU-China summit contrasted somewhat with the bickering of the EU-Russia summit held jut a few days later ironically just some 25 kilometers from the Chinese border. It was also not appreciably worse than the confusing EU-US summit and the virtually invisible EU-Japan one earlier in Prague. In brief, it appears that neither the EU in general or the Czech presidency had little to offer or to display as results from all these encounters with many of the EU's so-called "srategic" partners. It hould be hoped that a new team, drive or confidence will achieve more in the future or begin to call into question the validity of such processes or objectives.

It might be argued that much of the responsibility for the absence of progress on many issues lie with the weakness of the European representation in such high-level encounters and negotiations. It is hard to believe that a weak Czech presidency led by an unrepresentative Euroceptic Waclaw Klaus accompanied by a lameduck European Commision that has seemed incapable of leadership in the financial crisis or on numerous other battles would be potent negotiators.

On the heels of an EU-China High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue in Brussels the previous week marked by a lack of evident movement, the Prague meeting could have been expected either to mark time or register modest progress, which is perhaps what it did. The only noteworthy positions or declarations in both Brussels and Prague seemed to emanate from the newly-energised Chinese leaders, rather than their pale European counterparts.

If the EU ever hopes to achieve the full potential of its influence in China, or anywhere for that matter, it will in the future have to consider the full weight of it representatives. As an example, the EU envoys dispatched to argue the European case in Washington to the US Administration, Congress and public have for the past two decades generally been politically symbolic heavyweights with backgrounds as Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers. It should also be noted that the Obama Administration has just selected a Mandarin-speaking Governor seen as eventual Presidential candidate as its ambasador to Beijing, where he will have to prove his worth against the redoubtable Beijing elite. The previous US Treasury Secretary and the current one both had extensive experience in China. With the current EU delegation head closing out his tenure in China and a new concept in EU foreign service emerging, it might be time to begin thinking about a strategic replacement rather than the worthy names already circulating from the ranks of the administration in Brussels.

It should be someone with the stature, experience and intellect worthy of representing a European continent before Chinese Presidents, Ministers and others who are now world class players.There are a handful of former Premiers or Foreign Ministers who still travel regularly and command respect in Beijing who could engage as equals with the current and next generation of leadership in China.

The Prague and Brussels meetings have shown that the European hand must be played by a strong pair of hands. If Europe expects to be taken seriously, it must also be serious about its negotiators.

But contrary to some suggestions that China has been treating the EU with "disdain," there is considerable evidence that it has repeatedly made symbolic and concrete gestures toward Europe this year in relation to the economic and financial crisis that are unparalleled either for China and Europe. The visits by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to several European capitals, including the EU institutions in Brussels, should not be taken for granted, ignored or imply "pocketed" without reciprocity. Neither should the follow-up visit by Commerce Minister Chen Deming with a large delegation of Chinese business and economic leaders who spent an estimated $14 billion in orders placed in several EU markets. Even if the transactions were probably in the works already and probably the subject of tough negotiation for the best terms for the Chinese buyers, they and another promised purchasing mission planned for the coming weeks have not been matched by other EU partners. China has also indicated, but yet to organise with its European hosts a mission involving possible mergers, acquisition and investments by Chinese enterprises in Europe.

It is probably too much to ask from an EU leadership in the midst of an uncertain transition, but the forthcoming high-level encounters with China and other Asia and global partners need to produce more tangible results in the midst of the world financial and economic crisis, for the EU to either establish or restore its position as a credible leading force.

Begun with some expectations more than a year ago and propelled into a possibly key and urgent role in the current economic recession, the EU-China economic and trade dialogue in Brussels May 7-8 unfolded with barely a trace of an achievement or impact.

The High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue between senior Chinese and EU leaders was launched in late 2007 as an effort to replicate the US-China counterpart initiated by former US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson as a much-needed problem-solver and safety-valve to ease mounting economic and trade tensions between Beijing and Washington.

For whatever reasons of timing or personalities, the second such EU-China session in May gathered a Chinese Vice Premier, two ministers and officials and a team of European Commissioners and officials who apparently did not report any major or concrete results or accomplishments. The Commissioners, led by Catherine Ashton who recently replaced the high-flying and image-conscious Peter Mandelson at the trade portfolio, were all likely to be lame-ducks in the final phase of their tenure in Brussels. But their lack of visibility in this crucial and symbolic exercise might be seen as overly complacent.

Chinese State Council Vice Premier Wang Qishan, who headed his delegation, tried to calll attention to one or more of his country's objectives for the talks by writing well-timed and carefully-crafted commentaries in major European media to coincide with the Brussels meetings. In opinion pieces for the International Herald Tribune and the Financial Times, he stressed in the first, the general need to avoid protectionism, and in the second, for countries such as China and the UK to coordinate closely their fiscal, monetary and regulatory measures: "and make good use of 'both hands', the government and the market." In the first, he also appealed for the EU to grant China its long-sought "Market Economy Status."

Following the two days of sessions in Brussels though, the participants' declaraction were dominated by ritualistic support for the moribund Doha Round of world trade negotiations, focusing on cooperation to assist small and medium enterprises, energy and a second Chinese procurement delegation to Europe, following the initial one in March that resulted in announcements of some $14 billion in contracts for European products and services. The EU Commission statement placed the emphasis on Commissioner's belief that "trade and investment will lead us out of the current crisis"--a not entirely convincing declaration in view of continuing reports that both trade and investments are still plunging or stagnating virtually everywhere.

She told the press afterwards on May 8 that "We have shown that we can work together on setting the strategic direction of our relations, and that we can find ways of dealing with issues between us..." She also quoted Vice Premier Wang as saying that their talks were "inspirational.."

A more realistic declaration by the EU-China Chambre of Commerce, which also met with the officials, focused on more specific concerns and problems by leaders of European firms operating in China.

The latest outcome, or apparent lack of it, could undermine the credibility of the process, of the EU in both China and international perceptions, and worse of all, fail to produce any tangible results that could have an impact on resolving the current economic and financial crisis.

Although, the higher-level EU-China summit should finally take place in Prague later in May and provide another occasion to take some more visible joint steps forward on the road to recovery and more harmonious relations, this dialogue was supposed to have a distinct role in forging closer cooperation across a number of key areas. The participation of senior officials on both side from transport, environment, energy, consumer protection, agriculture, science and research and other fields would imply they were trying to work in that direction.

But the failure to report more than routine exchanges not only damages the process and the notion of transparency and accountability, but it could also imply that the work, like many other EU-China undertakings, is a"process" or "dialogue" that is not sufficiently result-oriented in the foreseable future. With markets, jobs and other important economic needs riding at least in part on the results for such contacts, the participants have something to prove--that they have a useful role to play. Instead what began as a high-level political and policy dialogue involving a Chinese Vice Premier and several ministers has given the impression of having been downgraded in Brussels into yet another obscure technical workshop between bureaucrats.

EU-Japan relations have evolved a long way over more than 30 years, ranging from stormy acrimony to somnolent normalcy, but never reaching their full potential, a reality seemingly again acknowledged at a Prague summit meeting May 4 that could mark a fresh start.

These relations reached shrill peak of displeasure in the 1970s amidst a sudden emergence of Japanese economic and commerce power, accompanied by a painful European trade deficit that presaged the more recent discomfort experienced with China. One senior European official at the time went so far as to express his wrath in writing, complaining of unfair competition from Japanese workers living in "rabbit hutches."

More effective means of trade crisis management prevailed afterwards and the relationship between these major economic powers evolved into more normal, mature and even routine contacts, despite occasional flareups, such as the outcry in mid-2008 by the former EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson for what he perceived to be Japan's lack of openness to outside investors in certain areas.

In the interval, both sides have nevertheless become a major presence in the other's market, with Japanese auto and other manufacturers carving out a significant but largely-unnoticed stake in the European economy.

For several years, relations were virtually paralysed by the indifference of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and his obsession with his partnership with Washington  in his term of office from 2001 to 2006, and since then by a series of weak and ephemeral successors. As a result, and also affected perhaps by the so-called "lost decade" of economic stagnation in Japan, EU-Japan contacts never lived up to their ambitious intentions, as embodied by their Joint Action Plan of 2001.

Even the Japanese Foreign Ministry's daily news feed issued only a cursory duplication of the Prague summit's joint press statement, of much lower profile in historic and diplomatic terms than an official summit declaration, perhaps reflecting the dual lame-duck status of the Japanese Government, the Czech hosts and the EU Commission.

During his muted voyage to Prague and Berlin that obtained hardly any media attention in either Europe or Japan, Prime Minister Taro Aso managed to raise regional dipomatic hackles by a declaration of concern about the nuclear weapons threat perceived from North Korea and China, and eyebrows with his reversal of previous criticism of German inaction in the face of the economic and financial crisis to one of praise for Berlin's recovery plans.

The 2009 summit may be remembered best for its effort to get the bilateral relationship on a more logical, appropriate and more positive path. The final declaration maintained the traditional pattern of touching verbally on virtually all items of a large agenda of mututal interests. But the emphasis was on a pledge for joint action to achieve results on the negotiations underway to go beyond the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change, an area in which the two might have had considerably more impact on the global scale if they had truly cooperated in the past.

They also looked forward to reviewing and replacing the grandiose 2001 bilateral Action Plan that has been highlighted for being more than a wish-list than a true work schedule, when it expires in 2011.

In the year since nature unleashed yet more devastation on the Irrawady Delta, evaluation reports about the survivors' conditions and the effectiveness of the relief efforts and government cooperation seem to vary widely, perhaps reflecting differing starting points and mind-sets.

Some stress the continuing plight of the populations, others the improving working conditions for international an local NGOs, while some continue to focus on the military-led government's general disregard for the population and human rights.

The EU Council of Ministers April 27 seemed to routinely extend its long-standing economic and political sanctions on the regime. But Derek Tonkin, who analyses the situation and policies affecting Burma/Myanmar on a regular basis from his base in Guildford, seemed to detect a change in the tone of the accompanying EU declaration regarding the sanctions, less hectoring , in his view than in the past, and continuing to hold out prospects for normalisation, without "benchmarks," or traditional pre-conditions.

He and others suggest that some policy review may be forthcoming in Europe, just as the Obama Administration in Washington indicated some reflection on the effectiveness of sanctions and general isolation.

The EU and some individual member states and other countries have also maintained the Three-Disease Fund there, which was established after Western political pressure forced the Global AIDS Fund to abandon its activities in the country.

And, at the EU-Japan summit meeting in Prague May 4, "Summit leaders expressed their hope that the Government of Myanmar tackles the country's severe political, structural and economic problems and fosters a peaceful transition to a legitimate, democratic and civilian government without delay. They pointed out that elections planned for 2010 could be welcomed by the international community if they were based on an inclusive dialogue among all the stakeholders in Myanmar."

In the meantime, others have raised warnings regarding a possible consequence of the storm and desparate conditions in Burma/Myanmar, that manifests itself in the outflow of fefugees, migrants, illegal workers and the inevitable abuse by human traffickers in nearby countries. While recent months put the spotlight on the dramatic situation of the Rohingyas into Bangladesh and even their deadly expulsions at sea, Charles Santiago, a member of the Malaysian Parliament and others have more recently called attention to the equally-lethal human trafficking in Thailand and Malaysia of Burmese migrants, who are sold into virtual slavery or prostitution in the region.

As part my activities as a lecturer and advisor on Asian studies with the Centre Européen de Recherches Internationales et Stratégiques (CERIS) (or European Centre for International and Strategic Research) in Brussels, I have to supervise work on some of the students' masters theses. This year, one has been submitted on the recent dispute between ASEAN neighbours, Thailand and Cambodia, over the Preah Vihear temple on their border.

I just finished reading it yesterday, while nursing our convalescing cat who was attacked by a fox last week.

While I recall the border incidents of 2008 and remember reading more about them, including the history of the disputed area dating back to the period of the First World War described to me by a friend, Stefan Hell, then in Hanoi and now in Beijing, who was doing a doctoral thesis on Siam's involvement in the War and the subsequent discussions with France, then the colonial power in Indochina, I do not have a great deal of background on the subject except to feel that the current dispute is another consequence of those often-arbitrary colonial borders.

But, without taking sides, what strikes me more is the inability of the current leaderships to deal appropriately with such problems. The two governments directly involved, of course are subject to pressures of public and political and nationalistic opinion, sometimes with not-so-hidden agendas. But ASEAN, the UN, other neighbours, or even the EU, might have tapped more effectively their conflict-prevention tool-box resources and good offices to help mitigate the clashes and avoid more bloodshed. Yes, only a few soldiers lost their lives and limbs in the 2008-2009 conflicts, but even those are too many.

This certainly seems like another test for the ASEAN system, as it enters a new era under its ambitious new Charter. While both parties would have had to agree at the time for ASEAN to discuss the issue, it would seem as if there still exists room for maneuvering either through back channels or Track II peacemakers. Someone as experienced and capable as ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan should be able to stimulate some positive mediation before more clashes erupt needlessly.