While the atmosphere at the EU-China Summit meeting in Prague May 20 seemed to be correct and cordial, it also seemed evident that the the six months' interval between the cancelled summit planned for Lyon in late 2008 and the one in Prague had not served to prepare any major breakthroughs.

Before the aborted meeting in Lyon, European diplomats had warned that little substantive headway should be expected on major problem areas, and Prague revealed that not much had changed, even if relations appeared by have been normalised after the turmoil raised by French President Sarkozy's meeting with the Dalai Lama that led to the cancellation.

Declarations emerged from Prague on such issues as trade negotiations, protectionism, climate change and other global issues, but problem areas related to the ongoing bilateral negotiations on a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), or market economy status, the arms embargo, or other traditional irritants seemed to remain.

Even if it achievements were less than resounding, the EU-China summit contrasted somewhat with the bickering of the EU-Russia summit held jut a few days later ironically just some 25 kilometers from the Chinese border. It was also not appreciably worse than the confusing EU-US summit and the virtually invisible EU-Japan one earlier in Prague. In brief, it appears that neither the EU in general or the Czech presidency had little to offer or to display as results from all these encounters with many of the EU's so-called "srategic" partners. It hould be hoped that a new team, drive or confidence will achieve more in the future or begin to call into question the validity of such processes or objectives.

It might be argued that much of the responsibility for the absence of progress on many issues lie with the weakness of the European representation in such high-level encounters and negotiations. It is hard to believe that a weak Czech presidency led by an unrepresentative Euroceptic Waclaw Klaus accompanied by a lameduck European Commision that has seemed incapable of leadership in the financial crisis or on numerous other battles would be potent negotiators.

On the heels of an EU-China High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue in Brussels the previous week marked by a lack of evident movement, the Prague meeting could have been expected either to mark time or register modest progress, which is perhaps what it did. The only noteworthy positions or declarations in both Brussels and Prague seemed to emanate from the newly-energised Chinese leaders, rather than their pale European counterparts.

If the EU ever hopes to achieve the full potential of its influence in China, or anywhere for that matter, it will in the future have to consider the full weight of it representatives. As an example, the EU envoys dispatched to argue the European case in Washington to the US Administration, Congress and public have for the past two decades generally been politically symbolic heavyweights with backgrounds as Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers. It should also be noted that the Obama Administration has just selected a Mandarin-speaking Governor seen as eventual Presidential candidate as its ambasador to Beijing, where he will have to prove his worth against the redoubtable Beijing elite. The previous US Treasury Secretary and the current one both had extensive experience in China. With the current EU delegation head closing out his tenure in China and a new concept in EU foreign service emerging, it might be time to begin thinking about a strategic replacement rather than the worthy names already circulating from the ranks of the administration in Brussels.

It should be someone with the stature, experience and intellect worthy of representing a European continent before Chinese Presidents, Ministers and others who are now world class players.There are a handful of former Premiers or Foreign Ministers who still travel regularly and command respect in Beijing who could engage as equals with the current and next generation of leadership in China.

The Prague and Brussels meetings have shown that the European hand must be played by a strong pair of hands. If Europe expects to be taken seriously, it must also be serious about its negotiators.

But contrary to some suggestions that China has been treating the EU with "disdain," there is considerable evidence that it has repeatedly made symbolic and concrete gestures toward Europe this year in relation to the economic and financial crisis that are unparalleled either for China and Europe. The visits by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao to several European capitals, including the EU institutions in Brussels, should not be taken for granted, ignored or imply "pocketed" without reciprocity. Neither should the follow-up visit by Commerce Minister Chen Deming with a large delegation of Chinese business and economic leaders who spent an estimated $14 billion in orders placed in several EU markets. Even if the transactions were probably in the works already and probably the subject of tough negotiation for the best terms for the Chinese buyers, they and another promised purchasing mission planned for the coming weeks have not been matched by other EU partners. China has also indicated, but yet to organise with its European hosts a mission involving possible mergers, acquisition and investments by Chinese enterprises in Europe.

It is probably too much to ask from an EU leadership in the midst of an uncertain transition, but the forthcoming high-level encounters with China and other Asia and global partners need to produce more tangible results in the midst of the world financial and economic crisis, for the EU to either establish or restore its position as a credible leading force.