by Dr. Paul Lim

The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the dialogue process which started in Bangkok in 1996 will be eight years old this March. It is a ‘forum’, as opposed to being a ‘grouping’, like the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

by Dr. Paul Lim

The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), the dialogue process which started in Bangkok in 1996 will be eight years old this March. It is a ‘forum’, as opposed to being a ‘grouping’, like the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

Dr. Paul Lim

With preparations now apace for the Fifth Summit meeting of ASEM in Hanoi (ASEM V) in October this year, perhaps, it is time to pause and reflect on what ASEM is all about, where it is going and what needs to be done to maintain forward momentum. In short, ‘Whither ASEM’.

A Unique Forum where the US is absent

ASEM is the only major forum of intra-regional cooperation between Asia and Europe where the US is absent as a participant. This is unusual, even remarkable.

Since the last war, the Americans have had their hands in most, if not all, fora, not to mention, major issues as well. Without American participation nothing was allowed to take off. Even as recently as in the 1990s, the USA had blocked such initiatives as Mahathir’s East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) and the call for an Asian Monetary Fund. Yet, the Americans did not object to the formation of ASEM. Is this because it had deputy sheriffs like the UK and Japan in the ASEM process? Or are the Americans confident that nothing serious could ever come about in any fora involving the EU, which, in the American view, is a collection of 15 factious countries – and that it would only get worse once it enlarges to 25 in May this year?

Cynical hypothesis aside, ASEM is an asset that the EU has in hand. The EU’s Security Doctrine after all talks of “effective multilateralism” and ASEM not only present an opportunity for the EU to reaffirm its new-found post-Cold war independence – if not equi-distance – from the US. It also affords the EU to carve out a role for itself and in its own right in the 21st century. If the EU wants to be effective internationally, it requires influence not only vis-à-vis the US, but also in Asia as a whole.

In the emerging world order, ASEM and APEC represent a tri-polar world, comprising the US, the EU and Asia. In other words, ASEM, where the US is not present, on the one hand, and APEC, where the EU is absent, on the other, are hinges that could bring the world together in some sort of equilibrium.

Seen in this light, the continued strengthening of the trans-Atlantic relationship is something to be welcomed. It adds value and helps square the circle of global cooperation and understanding. In other words, the trans-Atlantic relationship should be seen as part and parcel of that tri-polar calculus. But, all this depends on how the EU prioritises its relations with Asia vis-à-vis the US. If the EU is ever to realise “effective multilateralism”, then the EU should give proportionate attention to Asia.

“Effective multilateralism” is one reading. Another reading of the EU’s security doctrine is that the transatlantic relationship is primary, which raises the question of (Iraq demonstrates a unipolar world to the common man) a future bipolar world of the US and EU - with Asia as ancillary rather than the equi-distance of “effective multilateralism” with an independent EU voice.

However, global interdependence is a reality. In this new emerging global calculus, the EU cannot afford to ignore the third pole – Asia. If it does, the EU cannot take its place in the world stage and have its voice heard.

Asian concern of the EU’s commitment to ASEM

Since its inception, the ASEM was essentially a Heads of State/Government leadership-driven dialogue process with Meetings of Senior Officials (SOM) acting as the conduit to coordinate on issues between Summits.

Given this, attendance by Leaders at all previous four Summits has been good and their participation quite substantial. However, the same cannot be said, say Asian officials, of the European Foreign Ministers in the ASEM Process.

The poor attendance by EU Foreign Ministers at all ASEM meetings, even when they are held in European capitals, has not only raised the question of Europe’s commitment to ASEM process. There is also a fear of the EU’s internal pre-occupation over a raft of subjects, including constitutional reforms needed for enlargement as a contributing factor.

Europeans may explain the poor attendance to other pressing commitments of Ministers in implementing effective multilateralism and that from an institutional point of view their absence should not prevent work from going on. No matter how valid these explanations are, it raises the question of the EU’s commitment to ASEM, in building the tri-polar world.

The Asians seem to be asking a fundamental question of European commitment to ASEM and not just an issue of face in European participation in scheduled meetings.

Apparently, the problem has become so serious that at last July’s Bali ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting (FMM), the EU side came under heavy pressure over the question of poor EU Ministerial participation at ASEM - be they meetings of Foreign, Economic or other Ministers. The European side proposed the convening a ‘Special ASEM SOM’ to “streamline” ASEM’s “working methods” so as to make it “more efficient and effective”.

The relevant part of the Chairman’s statement of Bali FMM 5 reads:

“Considering the current and future situation of the ASEM process, in order to ensure a more substantive partnership, the Ministers asked the SOM to examine ways and means and make proposal to the FMM6 (Dublin) to be adopted at ASEM V (Hanoi Summit) on more efficient, effective and streamlined working method for the ASEM process. In this regard, an interim brainstorming session will be held before the end of 2003.”

Following the Bali decision, the Italian Presidency convened a Special ASEM SOM in Rome in November last year. Both sides, it is understood, were no closer to an answer at the end of the meeting than they were at the beginning.

Need for a Comprehensive Reflection on ASEM

This focus on “streamlining” ASEM’s “working methods” so as to make it “more efficient and effective” raises the question of whether this is enough. With eight years of ASEM, it is time to sit back and ask fundamental questions of ASEM.

Further, no amount of tinkering with ‘work methods’ of the ASEM process, including holding back-to-back meetings; redefinition of the roles of officials and Ministers or, for that matter, fine-tuning frequency of meetings or making the agenda more attractive, is going to re-energise ASEM so long as there is lack of commitment on the part of EU Ministers, says an Asian official. Commitment has to be dealt with first.

A comprehensive reflection on the future of ASEM must involve all actors. It should include academics, civil society, business and think tanks to find new vigour. Actors outside the official process can bring new thinking and fresh ideas. They can also be a source of pressure on EU governments in mobilising MPs, MEPs and the media. Such a review exercise should not only identify problems, but also make specific recommendations so as to enable leaders when they meet in Hanoi in October this year to show the way forward.

Examples of a fundamental review

An example of such a review, apart from answering questions of what is ASEM, what is to be achieved, where it is going, what is its vision, is also to question what has been or is being done? One concern of the writer are the clusters that give the impression that activities, initiatives, projects, have fallen in place, that there is a kind of coherence. It is just a classification system, but are these initiatives coherent with the overall conceptualisation of ASEM? Are they in fact national projects with national interests in mind? A thorough re-examination of the criteria for projects should be undertaken. Can projects be put to rest in peace if found out of coherence? There must be a sunset clause to end projects if found irrelevant. There is also no need to come up with new initiatives at every summit.

It is understandable to have these initiatives, projects and activities as they give ASEM legitimacy, especially when most European and Asian publics know little of ASEM. Public awareness leads to accountability: how public funds are spent and how they benefit the peoples of ASEM, which is where legitimacy comes in. For a start, legitimacy could be provided if initiatives are submitted to an independent committee to be vetted and approved. I wonder whether such a suggestion is acceptable to leaders and senior civil servants?

As for the future, education and training must form a large part of ASEM’s future work programme. It is in such non-traditional areas of cooperation and contact that ASEM can enrich Asia-Europe relationship.

The difficulties of Foreign Ministers to be present at meetings could ask the question of ASEM reverting to a wholly leadership-driven process with the SOM coordinating issues between Summits, without precluding Ministers including Foreign Ministers meeting whenever it is deemed necessary.

Civil society has entered into the orbit of ASEM. ASEM as an intergovernmental organisation seeks legitimacy by involving civil society. This is the view of the European side while, on the Asian side, different members have different attitudes towards civil society with some holding cautious attitudes. Hence, gradually bringing in civil society as some Asians expressed. Civil society is ready to engage ASEM with the concern that if not, ASEM forgets or ignores the social dimension and issues of concern to them which are people-centred. However, both sides have not been able to develop a viable working relationship. The heterogeneity of civil society groups also means that there are civil society groups which do not see the need to engage ASEM because ASEM leaders and officials will not listen to them or are totally against what ASEM is promoting or not promoting. This situation is to be expected in a democracy, but it also reflects the independence of civil society, which some Asian ASEM members still feel untenable. It is a long way to go still for a meaningful engaging dialogue between official ASEM and civil society,

The Malaysian Ambassador at the Asia-Europe Consultative Seminar with Civil Society raised the question of how civil society can take over the running of ASEF (the Asia-Europe Foundation) instead of leaving this core mandate in the hands of seconded civil servants. The core mandate should logically be driven by civil society; that real practitioners devise programmes that reach out to people in both regions in imaginative ways and that involvement of practitioners in designing and implementing programmes would not only bring about greater transparency, but also lend legitimacy.

Expansion of ASEM Membership

Another fundamental issue that has unnecessarily bogged down the ASEM process is the inclusion of the remaining three ASEAN members – Cambodia, Laos and Burma/Myanmar – into ASEM. The Madrid FMM 4 resolved that these three countries should be given priority over any other new entrants and that the issue be finally resolved by/or at ASEM V in Hanoi. The Asian side is firm on this issue. Could ASEM come to a halt over this issue?

The EU has its objections to Myanmar/Burma’s entry because of the non-observance of democracy by the military regime, particularly the non-respect of the results of the last elections, and the non-respect of human rights. The question is whether now it will allow Burma/Myanmar to hold ASEM to hostage? It has already given in to Myanmar/Burma’s participation in EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meetings for the reason that Burma cannot hold hostage EU-ASEAN relations. Apparently, it is only a handful few European partners that have problems with Myanmar/Burma. The human rights’ lobbies will be unhappy if the EU gives in to Myanmar/Burma’s admittance. It is more likely that a compromise will be worked out to allow ASEM to go on. In spite of ASEM’s informality, institutions refuse to die.

The Asian rather the ASEAN approach is engagement and dialogue. The government there needs help while the opposition needs to be equally guided to adopt a more realistic approach. As for the international community, they too need to show imagination so that all parties concerned can get out of the box. As a matter of fact, Burma/Myanmar presents Asia and Europe an opportunity to work together and help those Burmese/Myanmarese parties to carry out national reconciliation, to move forward so that they do not continue to slip and stumble.

If Burma/Myanmar cannot be solved in the Dublin Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on 17-18 April 2004, its membership in ASEM along with Vietnam and Laos will be kicked upstairs to the Heads of Governments and States to solve in Hanoi. From a larger perspective, one could say that ASEM stopped in its tracks over Burma will be a disappointment when it is one of those few international fora where the US is not a player or dominates.

A few successes of ASEM?

ASEM has afforded the occasion for countries of S.E. Asia and North East Asia to come together to powwow as they have to arrive at common positions vis-à-vis the EU. It has been said that this has been one reason which propelled ASEAN plus Three. De facto, some kind of realisation of Mahathir’s EAEG/EAEC has happened.

ASEM’s second pillar, TFAP and IPAP, has seen success in the first phase if the voluntary yearly implementation reports of ASEM countries are accepted as proof. It is now in the second phase, 2002-2004 and deliverables have again been set which can be viewed on the Commission’s website. This has enabled ASEM to move on to explore the Asian Bond Market, the use of the Euro in Asia etc. as in the Interim Report of the Task Force on Closer Economic Partnership between Asia and Europe.

September 11 2001 provoked a change of direction in the political pillar. The new atmosphere of security cooperation would be seen as a success while falling by the wayside human rights. In front of a common enemy, states and state personnel cooperate. Europeans are said now to be soft on human rights even if they extracted agreement to put in a line on human rights in statements coming out of ASEM Copenhagen. In Hanoi, security will remain on top of the agenda.

Conclusion

Restriction on length of this article prevents much more to be written above and here but to conclude one could just ask how post-Cancun will affect ASEM which has been used as a step to build towards the WTO? Will it be on the agenda of Hanoi?

Paul Lim is a lecturer at Universiti Sains Malaysia, in Penang, and Programme Coordinator of its International Studies Centre.